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EMILY SHERWIN

DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW: A COMMENT ON
SCHAUER
(Accepted 29 October 2002)

In his characteristically lucid paper, Neutrality and Judicial Review,1
Frederick Schauer revisits the meaning and plausibility of Herbert
Wechler’s argument for neutral principles in constitutional adjudication.2 Unlike some critics, Schauer takes the argument seriously,
on its own terms, and does an excellent job of sorting through the
different ideas that lie behind it.
Schauer identifies four different versions of the argument for
neutrality. At least three of these are drawn from Wechsler’s 1959
article. Schauer is particularly interested in a fourth version, which
favors neutrality in the design and management of the institution of
judicial review.

I. NEUTRALITY INHERENT IN DECISION ACCORDING TO RULES

Some of the arguments Wechsler presented in 1959 quoted neutrality with decision according to principles. Principles, for this
purpose, are reasons stated in the form of rules, which the court will
continue to adhere to in future cases that fall within the scope of the
rules.3 Wechsler’s objection to Shelley v. Kraemer,4 for example,
was that the only reason the Supreme Court gave for its decision –
that state enforcement of private agreements is action by the state –
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1 Frederick Schauer, “Neutrality and Judicial Review”, L. & Phil. (2003).
2 Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law”, Harv.
L. Rev. 73 (1959), p. .
3 See Schauer, supra note 1, at n. 11.
4 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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was not a reason it would abide by in other future cases.5 His objection to the series of desegregation cases following Brown v. Board of
Education6 was the absence of any reason at all apart from citation
to Brown, although the stated rationale of Brown was inapplicable.7
Schauer is generally favorable to decision-making according to
rules.8 He points out, however, that rule-following has nothing to
do with neutrality in the sense of impartiality among competing
groups and values, because the rules themselves may be partial.9
Schauer also questions the link Wechsler found between decision
according to rule and legitimate exercise of the power of judicial review. Wechsler appeared to assume that a key part of the
justification for judicial review was the legal character of judicial
decision-making: the Constitution is law and should be applied by
legal experts using legal modes of reasoning, such as reasoning
from rules and at least a moderate respect for precedent.10 Schauer
counters that, even if we assume that there are special legal modes
reasoning, leading justifications for judicial review, such as protection of anti-majoritarian values and enlistment of multiple decisionmakers, do not depend on legal reasoning. Lawyers have no special
“anti-majoritarian wisdom,” and there can be multiple political
decision-makers without giving the final word to lawyers.11
Schauer is surely right that decision according to rules is not
neutral, nor is it peculiarly legal. Yet, once the Court has undertaken
the task of judicial review, there are good reasons why it should
work to articulate and maintain stable rules of constitutional law.
Anti-majoritarian values are often best protected by the establish5

Wechsler, supra note 2, at pp. 29–30.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 Wechsler, supra note 2, at pp. 22–23.
8 See Frederick Schauer, “Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and Life” (1991), pp. 135–166.
9 Schauer, supra note 1, at p. 2; see Kent Greenawalt, “The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles”, Colum. L. Rev. 78 (1978), pp. 982, 992 (maintaining
that Wechsler did “not mean by neutral principles to assert that judges can be
neutral among values).
10 See Wechsler, supra note 2, at pp. 15–16 (discussing “the type of reasoned
explanation . . . that is intrinsic to judicial action” and its relationship to judicial
review of legislation).
11 Schauer, supra note 1, at pp. 7–8.
6
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ment of rights. As Schauer himself has argued, rights must be
“logically antecedent” to decisions in particular cases, in order to
hold their meaning and become part of the shared culture of the
community.12 In this way, decision according to rule may play a
greater part than Schauer allows in the practice of judicial review.

II. DETERMINACY

The second meaning of neutrality is what Schauer calls neutrality
of application. To be neutral in this sense, the Court must derive
its decisions from the Constitution, without relying on contestable
extrinsic moral, political, or empirical values. Another way to put
this is that the Court acts neutrally when it applies determinate
Constitutional rules.
Schauer believes that rules can provide determinate answers, at
least in easy cases. Rules have a meaning that stands apart from the
values of the decision-maker.13 Again, determinacy is not equivalent to value-neutrality, because rules can be both determinate and
partial. But determinacy is a logical possibility and adherence to
determinate rules has significant benefits.
Schauer also suggests that application of determinate rules (or,
interpretation of rules in a way that permits determinate application)
can contribute to the legitimacy of counter-majoritarian decisionmaking. A judge is more justified in reversing a legislature on the
basis of a fixed rule than on the basis of a disagreement about
values. However, Schauer concludes that the interesting and controversial provisions of our Constitution simply are not determinate
in this way. Therefore, although determinate application might be
desirable, it is not realistically possible.14
Again, Schauer’s analysis is quite persuasive. A possible qualification is that, although the Constitution is not a strictly determinate document, determinacy is a question of degree. The Court
has choices among interpretive approaches, and an approach that
12 Frederick Schauer, “The Generality of Rights”, Legal Theory 6 (2000),
pp. 323, 329.
13 Schauer, supra note 8, at pp. 53–62; Frederick Shauer, “Easy Cases”, S. Cal.
L. Rev. 58 (1985), p. 399.
14 Schauer, supra note 1, at pp. 9–12.
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produces comparatively determinate interpretations may lead to
comparatively greater legitimacy.

III. NEUTRAL CONTENT

A third meaning of neutrality is that the rules the court derives
from the Constitution should themselves be neutral, in the sense
that they should not take sides among persons, groups, and points
of view. Schauer argues persuasively that neutral principles in this
sense cannot exist. A principle that is less than infinite in scope
must discriminate. More importantly, a principle, being a reason,
necessarily reflects a value and thus cannot be neutral toward incompatible values.15 (This is famously true of liberalism as a political
theory: liberalism espouses tolerance, but a liberal polity cannot
be tolerant of illiberal positions.16) On these points, Schauer is
unassailable.

IV. NEUTRALITY IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

In the final section of the paper, Scahuer sets out another possible
understanding of neutrality: neutrality in institutional design, and in
particular, neutrality in designing the institution of judicial review.
For example, liberals who supported aggressive judicial review by
the Warren Court fail to be neutral in this sense when they condemn
Lochner or criticize the Rehnquist Court for activism and departure
from precedent.17
In Schauer’s view, this form of non-neutralilty is acceptable and
possibly desirable, at least if one takes an instrumental view of law
and judicial review. More precisely, Schauer argues that neutrality
in one’s approach to judicial review is required only if “law is in
some important way ontologically primary,” or if “its institutions,
because of the desirably hide-bound nature of law, are or ought to
be especially difficult to change.” If law, and judicial review, are
15

Ibid. at pp. 13–16.
See Larry Alexander, “Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology”, San Diego L. Rev. 30 (1993), p. 763.
17 Schauer, supra note 1, at pp. 16–19.
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essentially “instrumental to other things” then they should vary as
necessary to best promote “moral and political goals.”18
When he speaks of neutrality in institutional design, Schauer
may have in mind one of three different ideas, which mirror the
first three versions of neutrality he explores. Neutrality in designing
the institution of judicial review might mean that judicial review
should be governed by stable rules; it might mean that decisions
about judicial rule should find determinate guidance in Constitutional material; or it might mean that the rules governing judicial
review should be value-free.
Schauer’s example – liberal arguments about judicial review that
change with the make-up of the court – suggests that his focus is not
on determinacy. The liberal switch does not involve the application
of an indeterminate standard, but rather a switch among favored
rules. Alternatively, Schauer might be arguing that values should
enter into the choice of approaches to judicial view.19 But this too
seems improbable: having argued to persuasively that no rule or
principle, and presumably no institution, can be value-free, Schauer
would be taking on an already vanquished foe. Thus, it seems most
likely that what Schauer means by neutrality in designing the institution of judicial review is adherence to a consistent set of rules
of judicial review – rules about Constitutional interpretation and
judicial behavior toward legislation.
In my view, Schauer is quite right that law and legal institutions
are best viewed instrumentally. Yet I am not convinced that nonneutrality in the institutional design of judicial review is desirable
from an instrumental point of view.20
One difficulty is that, to the extent that constrained review is the
right approach for some courts at some times, constraint may not
be a feature that can be switched off and on. Just how judges (or
anyone) can be constrained by rules is a psychological mystery.21
18

Ibid. at p. 19.
Schauer’s reference to “non-neutral discourse in designing the institution of
judicial review” hints at this position. Ibid. at p. 19.
20 Personally, I am partial to “hide-bound” law, but I will not pursue that point
here.
21 See Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, “The Rule of Rules: Morality,
Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law” (2001), pp. 53–95; Heidi M. Hurd, “Moral
Combat”, (1999), pp. 76–94; Schauer, supra note 8, at pp. 128–134.
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The best explanation is that constraint comes from internalization
of rules through professional training, habit, and concern for reputation. If this is correct, then once the habits of mind necessary to
conform to constraining rules are gone, they will be difficult if not
impossible to reconstruct.
Schauer’s discussion also raises questions about the nature of
non-neutral institutional design, which may bear on its instrumental
value. First, Schauer suggests that the institution of judicial review
might change over time in response to changes in the make-up of
the Court and the political environment in which it operates.22 Yet,
it seems hard to contain the idea of non-neutral design to different
eras. Should the Court’s approach to judicial review also change
from subject to subject, allowing one set of practices for review
of school voucher legislation and another for review of land use
regulations?
Second, who designs the institution? That is, who decides how
the court should approach judicial review in any given era? Can it
be the judges themselves? Is it the Senate, acting politically? Is there
a meta-principle that should govern the decision?
These uncertainties aside, Schauer poses a serious challenge to
those who might argue for a constant set of rules for the institution
of judicial review. At a minimum, a proponent of constancy must
identify what ends (aside from context-specific political ends) the
institution should serve and how those ends are best promoted. For
example, certain approaches to judicial review, applied consistently,
will add to the stability of rights and duties; others will encourage a
quicker proliferation of rights and make rights more responsible to
changing social conditions. If, as Schauer has suggested, the rights
shared by members of a community are part of the bond that unites
them, these are important question, which perhaps should be settled
rather than left for ad hoc response. Yet, the Constitution, which can
barely be made out to authorize judicial review, provides no obvious
means for their settlement.
University of San Diego Law School
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
22

Schauer, supra note 1, at p. 16.

